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ABSTRACT 
Omnipresent  control  of  Uzbekistan  government  in  agriculture  undermines  land  tenure  security 
among the farmers and as result leads to low productivity and low incentives for investment into the 
land. In its turn low productivity in cotton farms worries the Uzbek policy makers on whether 
giving more freedom to “private” farms will adversely alter vital production of cotton. In this study 
we hypothesized on opportunity of enhancing land tenure security in today’s Uzbekistan without 
altering government’s demand for cotton. Specifically we showed that relaxing requirement over 
the land occupation under cotton while leaving only government demand for output will result in 
freeing  significant  percentage  of  land  area  and  consequently  enhancing  land  [property]  rights. 
Indeed,  our  estimates  suggest  that  depending  on  the  soil  quality  and  entrepreneurship  skills  of 
farmer, from 3% to 6% of farm lands can be potentially taken out off the cotton production and 
used for producing alternative crops. 
Keywords: Uzbekistan, cropping structure, land tenure security 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Late history of land reform in Uzbekistan evolves around the restructurisation of collective farms. 
After  gaining  the  independence  all  collective  farms  and  state  farms  were  reorganized  into 
[collective] production cooperatives (shirkats) and medium-scale land-leasing farms. In 1995 there 
were  3699  production  cooperatives  and  17.1  thousand  land-leasing  farms  in  Uzbekistan.  Yet, 
transforming  collective  farms  into  production  cooperatives  was  only  intermediate  stage  in  the 
restructurisation reform. In 2003 the “Concept of Development of Farms” initiated restructuring 
large-scale production cooperatives to more than 200 thousand medium-scale land-leasing frams.  
According  to  the  law  private  land-leasing  farms  are  entitled  to  more  rights  for  land  use  than 
production cooperatives were. Under current land rights farmers lease land from the state for the 
maximum period of 49 years. At the same time farmers cannot sub-lease their plots to the third 
parties, and cannot use plots as collateral in obtaining credits. In addition farmer face risks of losing 
the land if he/she does not meet the government order for cotton or used cotton plot for cultivating 
other crops.  
Experts agree that such land rights are far from solving long-set issues in Uzbekistan’s agriculture. 
Macroeconomic statistics suggest that production levels go down. Excessive application of mineral 
fertilizers continues. As result soil quality keeps deteriorating. (Chertovitskiy, 2007).  
The  government  has  long  recognized  these  problems  and  has  been  seeking  ways  to  encourage 
farmers to increase cotton production and invest into soil improvement. Current practice forbids 
farmers  to  produce  second  crops  after  winter  wheat  grain  is  harvested,  prohibits  any  rotation 
schemes in cotton fields, and provides more mineral fertilizers at low prices. Alongside government 
encourages farmers to use longer-term agritechnological activities, which aim at soil improvement. 
However, farmers are under heavy pressure of submitting the government orders for cotton. This 
factor determines the choice that most farmers do in favoring short-term agricultural technology 
activities vs. long-term acitivities. In order to meet the government order for cotton, which every 
year is getting higher, farmers extensively use fertilizers. Attractiveness of this activity is that use of 
greater quantities of fertilizers allow increase production levels to meet the government orders and 
thus avoid the risk of losing the land. However, excessive use of fertilisers negatively impacts the 
soil quality in longer term. On the other hand the reason why farmers do not use long-term activities 
is that result from them [i.e. increase in production levels] cannot be achieved immediately, but 
rather after some years.  
Clearly current land rights in Uzbekistan have weak foundation. In turn weak land rights hinders 
farmers incentives to invest to the soil imrpovement. Relationship between land rights and farmers    3 
incentives have been thoroughly investigated in the past. (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Feder and 
Feeny, 1993; Lin, 1993; Besley, 1995). 
These studies established four linakges between farmer’s investment incentives and land rights. Li 
et al. (2000) summarised these four linkages with investment incentives as following: (1) tenure 
security (Jacoby et al., 2000); (2) ability to collaterize the land plot (Feder and Feeny, 1993); (3) 
land transfer rights (Besley, 1995); and (4) quota policy (Lin, 1993).  
In  our  study  we  used  arguments  from  mentioned  studies  to  estimate  the  welfare  effects  from 
relaxing the  control over the land use on quota crops, which corresponds with relationship (4) 
between quota policy and farmers investment incentive, and fixing cotton quota for three years 
instead of one, which corresponds with relationship (1) between secure tenure rights and farmers 
incentives to invest.  
Rest of the paper is shaped in the following way. Section 1 provides the results of welfare analysis. 
Section 2 discusses results and provides policy implications.  
2.  QUOTA POLICY AND FARMERS INVESTMENT INCENTIVES 
2.1 CURRENT SITUATION 
The Law on Farming Entities and long-term lease agreements stipulate areas of land under cotton 
and grain and minimum crop yields for the leased land, which local governments annually pass 
down  to  farmers.  Minimum  crop  yields  and  output  orders,  in  turn,  are  based  on  the  last  year 
supplies.  
Further state order for cotton is setting both the land area under cotton cultivation and the levels of 
cotton output. Such decisions are made first on the national level, then on oblast’ levels, and then 
further on rayon levels. Rayon khokim receives from the top the amount of cotton his/her rayon has 
to submit. Then, khokim divides the amount of cotton order to the land area that farmers obliged to 
grow cotton on [when designing business plans], and as such derives the [planned] average cotton 
yield per hectare. This [planned] average yield is then applied to all farmers as control measure for 
cotton production to meet state order. In turn it means that all farmers in spite of differences in land 
quality and plot size should obtain the same yield figures.  
Obviously, linkage of the state orders to the requirement to use lands only for one crop considerably 
undermines production and financial capabilities of farmers. In addition our survey indicated that 
virtually all cotton farmers produce almost exactly the amount of cotton that they are assigned as 
their quota.  Farmers appear able to produce the required amount regardless of the quality of their 
land.  While it may be difficult for farmers with low quality land to increase their production it 
seems  clear  that  given  the  proper  incentives,  farmers  with  medium  or  high  quality  land  could 
produce more.  
The government has long recognized this problem and has been seeking ways to encourage farmers 
to increase their production. For a few years the Government tried experimental payments of bonus 
price 20% higher than the regular price for any cotton submitted above the quota.  However, even 
with this promised bonus few farmers produced more than their quota. Indeed it seems strange that 
80% of farmers produce cotton in amounts exact equal to government quota (see Figure 1).     4 
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Source: Farmers survey, Syrdarya, 2006 in Chertovitskiy (2007). 
Farm level calculations showed us that number of farmers in Syrdarya region that produced above 
quota  is  few.  10%  of  farmers  produced  above  the  quota  by  maximum  of  5%.  We  thus  were 
interested in exploring the reasons for that. 
There are at least three possible explanations: 
·  The quotas are calculated very precisely and farmers cannot produce more than their quota; 
·  Farmers do not have sufficient knowledge of how they can increase their production; or 
·  Farmers believe (correctly or not) that they will not receive the calculated profit or that they 
will be penalized in future years. 
We will examine each of these possible explanations. 
(1)  Possibility that quotas are calculated precisely.   
Farmers reported to us that within a rayon, all farmers are assumed to have the same yield per 
hectare when their quotas are calculated.  Even within a small geographical area, some land is of 
much higher quality than others, so this hypothesis is easily rejected. 
(2)  Possibility that farmers lack knowledge of methods to increase their production. 
It seems unlikely that this hypothesis fully explains the failure of more farmers to increase their 
production.  Each collective had a number of managers who had an understanding of the factors 
influencing production.  The new owners of the private farms live very closely with other farmers 
and  would  quickly  emulate  techniques  successful  applied  by  their  neighbors.    While  increased 
training  of  farmers  could  improve  their  understanding  of  modern  farming  techniques  there  are 
clearly some farmers who have the technical knowledge necessary to increase their production if 
they believed that they would be compensated properly for their increase. 
(3)  Possibility that farmers believe that they will not be rewarded for increased production. 
80% 
farmers    5 
Survey results suggest that most farmers produce exact amount of the cotton because they are afraid 
that even if they receive compensation for extra cotton this year, next year they can be penalized in 
the future by higher cotton quotas. If quota in future years will be increased to reflect additional 
production of this year, then farmers risk losing lease if they are unable to meet the higher quota.  
Finally, it is possible that the actions to enable a farmer to increase his cotton yield have a delayed 
result.  For example, washing the land to reduce salinity should be done every 3-4 years to maintain 
production.    However,  the  loss  of  production  in  any  one  year  from  delaying  the  washing  is 
insufficient to offset the cost if the farmer believes that he may lose his lease.  
Review of the current system of government cotton orders and government set incentives suggest 
that there are still more farmers who is not interested in increasing their production. Such finding 
moved us in analysing alternative approaches that government may try to make farmers interested 
in increasing cotton production. 
2.2 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
One alternative approach is to relax government control over the land use. That is to permit farmer 
to grow other crops on a small portion of his land if he/she agrees to grow enough cotton on his 
remaining land so that he/she can meet the quota.  
The attractiveness of this approach depends on the farmer’s confidence that he can divert some of 
his land to other crops and still meet his quota and on the profitability of alternative crops.  An 
advantage for the farmer is that he does not feel that he will be at the mercy of the khokimiat 
regarding whether or not he will receive his bonus because at the beginning of the year he will plant 
some of his land with alternative crop. One disadvantage is that the farmer will need to find the 
funds  necessary  to  pay  for  seeds  and  fertilizer  for  the  alternative  crop.  Currently  farmers  are 
charged for the cost of  cotton seeds and  fertilizers but these  are paper  transactions against the 
payments they will eventually receive for their cotton crop.  In contrast, the farmers will have to pay 
cash for vegetable seeds and fertilizers. 
Another alternative is fixing quota for number of years instead of making quota every year. This 
way farmer will have certainty that whether first year supplies of cotton will be greater than or 
equal to quota this is not going to affect the next year quota.  
We now consider in greater detail the feasibility of the exist practices and alternative options.  
Notably, the bulk of farmers emphasized that it would be better for them to sign contracts for supply 
of  certain  volumes  of  production  having  no  provision  to  grow  cotton/grain  on  specifically 
designated lands. Thus farmers would have had more freedom in managing their land.  
In fact, the analysis of 39 farms of Istiqlol Association in Sirdarya region reveals that freedom in 
selection of lands for cotton cultivation in contrast to current practices of growing cotton on the 
specifically designated areas would result in savings from 3 to 6% of the land area, while the 
volumes of the government procurement would remain at the same level. Freed lands could be used 
both for crop rotation and for growing of other commercial crops (forage, rice and other). (See 
Table 1) 
In farmers union under our survey cotton is cultivated on the total area of 461 hectares. The average 
size of farms and crop capacity of cotton vary depending on land fertility. Therefore in analysis we 
thought it would be reasonable to group farms  by land quality.  According to the land quality 
scoring method (BBP) we broke down the 39 farms into three groups.  Group 1 – farms with BBP 
41-50, group 2 – farms with BBP 51-60, group 3 – farms with BBP 61-70.
1  
                                                 
1 In  order  to  justify  groupping  farmers  according  to  the  soil  quality  we  preformed  two-tail  t-test  for  significant 
difference in cotton yield between three mentioned groups. In two out of three groups we were able to reject the 
hypothesis of no difference between the yields across the groups.    6 
Our estimates of the areas which might be freed we based on two assumptions. First, we made an 
assumption that farmers in our study are risk neutral, meaning they do not react to any risk of 
making profit. Secondly, we made an assumption that farmers in our study have naive expectations 
about the levels of productions. That means that farmers expect to have output in the next year at 
the  same  level  as  they  had  in  the  past.  Based  on  these  expectations  and  knowing  a  priori  the 
government  order  that  he/she  has  to  submit,  farmer  will  manage  the  land  tenure  for  cotton 
production. 
In theory we expect that the higher the land quality is the greater amount of output can be produced 
from that land. However, under the naïve expectations we do not take into account land quality. In 
its turn projected output levels reflect the current production levels.   
Group-based  analysis  showed  that  the  area  of  freed  land  vary  by  group  of  the  farms.    Under 
maintaining state orders with freedom in determining areas under the crops  (line F) provided the 
actual crop yield in the group of farms remain the same (line Е) it looks that in order to produce the 
required order it is sufficient to grow cotton on the total area of 450 hectares (line Н).  Thus the area 
of 11.2 hectares (line I) can be potentially freed. (Table 1) 
Comparing results from group estimates suggest that the higher the quality of land the larger is the 
freed area. In group 1 with BBP 41-50 for 9 farms only 0.8 hectare can be freed, or 0.1 hectare per 
the farm on the average.  In group 2 with BBP 51-60 for 20 farms 3.2 hectares can be freed, or 0.2 
hectare per the farm on the average.  In group 3 with BBP 61-70 for 12 farms potential saving of 
land would be 7.2 hectares, or 0.6 hectare per the farm on the average.  
Table 1:  Analysis of Impact of Granting More Freedom to Manage the Lands 
BBP (Land quality score) 
Name   
41-50  51-60  61-70 
Total 
Group     1  2  3   
Number of Farms  A  9  20  12   
Total Land Area, hectares  B  118.0  234.1  109.4  461.5 
Average cotton field, ha/farm    13,1  11,7  9,1   
Cadastre crop yield, 100 kg/ha *  C  18.04  23.28  25.33   
Planned crop yield, 100 kg/ha **  D  27.9  28.3  28.5   
Actual crop yield, 100 kg/ha ***  E  28.1  28.6  30.6   
Group-based estimations 
Production of quotas according to the state 
order, centners  F = B * D  3293.3  6613.3  3121.5  13028.1 
Production of state order, actual, centners  G = B * E  3315.8  6704.6  3342.2  13362.6 
Area of land necessary to produce the 
quota (state order), hectare   H = F / E  117.2  230.9  102.2  450.3 
Area of potentially freed land, hectare  I = B – H  0.8  3.2  7.2  11.2 
Average area of freed land, hectare/farm  K = I / A  0.1  0.2  0.6   
* -- Cadastre crop yield is estimated in accordance with the BBP methodology, cadastre crop yield = BBP х 0.4 
** -- Planned (target) crop yield is estimated by local (district) government on the basis of crop yield indicators of the 
previous year 
*** -- Actual crop yield – de facto cotton crop yield. 
Source:  Farmers survey, Syrdarya, 2006 in Chertovitskiy (2007). 
 
Translating findings from analysis of farm union to the national scale should be done carefully. We 
used findings from group-based estimations to draw on possible changes in the national scale. There    7 
is no data available on land quality on every individual farm in the country. However, data on land 
quality in cotton fields in 12 regions of Uzbekistan is accessible.  
Our data suggest that there is one farmer in group 2 with BBP 51-60 with potential to withdraw 1 ha 
from cotton production. We also know that total land area in group 2 with BBP 51-60 in Istiqlol 
farm union equals to 234 ha. That means that 0.4 % of land area in group 2 with BBP 51-60 can be 
freed.  In  Uzbekistan  there  are  750  thousand  ha  of  land  area  that  has  BBP  51-60.  Making 
extrapolation from Istiqlol farm union to the national scale we will get that 3000 ha in lands with 
BBP 51-60 in the whole country that could be withdrawn. 
Likewise in group 3 with BBP 61-70 we know that there is area of 5 ha that can be potentially freed 
from cotton production. Total land area with BBP 61-70 in Istiqlol farm union equals to 109.4 ha. 
That means that 5% of land area with BBP 61-70 can be withdrawn. Extrapolating to the country 
scale yields that almost 29,8 thousand ha of land with BBP 61-70 can be potentially withdrawn 
from cotton production. 
Further  for  lands  with  higher  BBP  we  used  5%  as  the  threshold  number  for  land  that  can  be 
potentially  withdrawn.  It  turns  out  that  19,8  thousand  ha  can  be  withdrawn  from  the  cotton 
production.  
Overall, 56 thousand ha of land in Uzbekistan can be withdrawn from cotton production with no 
adverse impact on the levels of state orders for cotton. This figure make 5% of total land area 
occupied under cotton production in Uzbekistan today.  
For better understanding whether farmers continue growing cotton if freedom for land management 
is granted we looked at the average farm field with 10 ha land area. For this we considered three 
different cases. Under case A we showed the economics of producing cotton according to the quota. 
Under cases B.1 and B.2 we showed what additional costs and additional benefits will farmer see if 
he/she supplies more than the required quota. In case B.1. farmer produces extra cotton and receives 
the  regular  state  procurement  prices.  While  in  case  B.2.  farmer  receives  20%  bonus  on  extra 
supplied cotton. 
Finally, under case C we estimated how much would the farmer it cost to produce the quota on less 
than required area, i.e. on 9 ha instead of 10 ha. In addition we calculated what would be the costs 
and  revenues  from  producing  alternative  crops  on  freed  area  of  1  ha.  Number  of  crops  in 
combination with which farmer can financially profitable operate are limited. These were identified 
as cabbage, potato, and tomato.(See Table 2)
2  
In our analysis we referred to measurements of average rate of returns (ARR) and marginal rate of 
return (MRR). ARR in the base case was calculated to be equal to 1.34. This translates as following: 
to every soum spent on farm activity (cotton production) farmer received 1.34 soum back.  
While MRR measurement translates as the ratio of marginal revenue over the marginal cost. In case 
B.1 the MRR equals 1.48, which means that for every additionally invested 1 soum farmer received 
1.48 soum back. Note that this figure is greater than the ARR for this case. 
Results of our analysis suggest that while it is costly to farmer to switch from mono-cotton scheme 
to cotton-cabbage, cotton-potato, and cotton-tomato schemes the returns from these schemes will be 
high enough to cover these costs. The questions then are how many and what kind of farmers will 
switch, and what are the most likely crops farmers will switch to. 
Calculation of ARR and MRR of schemes cotton-onion and cotton-carrot have yielded results lower 
than in the base case. This leads us to the conclusion that if farmer is profit-seeking and if he has a 
                                                 
2 Reason for why we selected these crops is that these were the only crops which in combination with cotton brought 
positive returns according to calculated ARR and MRR.    8 
choice to follow one of the schemes than it is most likely that he/she will choose between cotton-
cabbage, cotton-potato, and cotton-tomato schemes.
3  
Answer to the prior question is – it depends on the budget constraints and land area. Land area plays 
important role. It is most likely that farmers with greater land area will be able to switch to two-crop 
schemes,  than  the  others.  The  budget  constraints  are  also  critical  to  keep  in  mind.  Note  that 
production of cabbage, potato and tomato is very expensive farm activity. Because prices for tomato 
across the season change dramatically and because this crop is more perishable than the other two 
crops, adds more cost and risk to it. 
 
Table 2: Farm management schemes 










ARR  MRR 
Base case  10  154    29,0  1,34   
Case  B.1.  –  production 
increase  
10  153  140  31,9  1,35  1,48 
Case  B.2.  –  production 
increase  with  20%  bonus 
payment 
10  153  140  31,9  1,37  1,68 
Case  C  –  “cotton-potato” 
scheme (only cotton) 
9  160  210  29,0  1,30  0,99 
Sum with potato  10      29,0  1,66  2,57 
Source: Farmers survey, Syrdarya, 2006 in Chertovitskiy (2007). 
Findings from cotton production schemes allowed us to estimate possible outcomes for producers, 
consumers and the government.  
First we started with determining the effects on society. In order to do this we defined the Net 
Efficiency  (NE)  as  the  difference  between  the  Net  Value  of  product  (NV),  the  Total  Cost  for 
producing this product (TC), and the government spending on cotton subsidies (GovSub). (See 
Table 3) 
Further  we  determined  what  gains  and  losses  have  producers.  In  the  current  cotton  production 
system producers have access to low price fuel and fertilizers. However, they also market their 
cotton  on  artificially  low  price.  Thus,  in  order  to  more  realistically  calculate  the  producers 
gains/losses we had defined the Producer Surplus (PS) as product of quantity of produced good (Q) 
and the difference between the Domestic producer price (Pd) and the average cost (AC) of this good.  
Finding effects on consumers side was somehow complicated in the sense that it is hard to show the 
price that final consumer pays for 1 kilo of raw cotton. Major consumers of cotton are cotton 
collection units and gin factories, which charge the same price for the raw cotton that they paid to 
producers. Thus, in our study consumer price for cotton was equal to producer price. We defined 
consumer surplus as product of quantity  of produced  good (Q) and the difference between the 
domestic consumer price (Pm) and the domestic producer price (Pd) of this good. 
Interpreting government gains/losses from cotton production however needs caution. Note that in 
deriving the net efficiency result from cotton we also referred to the subsidies that government 
provides to cotton producers. Thus in our estimation of government surplus (GS) we extracted the 
                                                 
3 Although it is questionable whether farmer will choose cotton-cabbage scheme as it is costly, while the rate of returns 
is not different from increased cotton production scheme (case B).    9 
amount of subsidies from the product of quantity of produced cotton and difference between the 
world and domestic prices.
4 
In the base scenario the net value of produced cotton in Uzbekistan equals 1.2 billion USD. Out of 
this value the society as the whole enjoys gains in amount of 582 million USD. From this producers 
share equals to 343 million USD. While government surplus is 238 million USD
5 
In the scenario when control over the land use is relaxed with cotton orders we estimated that up to 
56 thousand ha can be withdrawn from cotton production. As result total cost to produce the same 
quantity of cotton on smaller area will increase to 609 millions USD nationwide, or up to 173 
USD/ton in average vs. 154 USD/ton in the base scenario. Net efficiency from producing cotton on 
smaller  areas  will  decrease  on  the  account  of  decreased  producers  surplus.  While  governments 
surplus will remain unchanged.  
When costs and benefits from producing vegetables on withdrawn land areas taken into account 
figures change significantly. Producers gain from producing vegetables was estimated to be equal to 
84 mil. USD. This in summation with surplus from cotton is higher than the producers surplus 
under the current situation. 
Consumers will gain from lower consumer prices for greater amount of vegetables produced in the 
country. We estimated that such gain will be equal to 16,8 million USD. (Table 3) 
Table 3: Welfare analysis of costs and benefits of possible relaxation over the land use under 
cotton quota, mill. USD 
Scenario B 
  
   Scenario 
A (Base)  Cotton  Vegetables  Sum 
Domestic producer price, 
USD/ton 
a  Pd  252  252  145    
Domestic consumer price, 
USD/ton  Pm  252  252  160    
World price, USD/ton 
b  Pw  333  333  160    
Output, ‘000 tons  Q  3,525  3,525  1,456    
Average cost, USD/ton   AC  154  173  70    
Cost per country, ‘000 
USD  TC  543, 803   609,077  78,400  687,477 
Government subsidy, 
USD/ton  S  14  14     14 
Total government 
spending, ‘000 USD
6  GovSub  49,35  49,351     49,351 
Net value (at World price), 
‘000 USD  NV=PW x Q  1,175,045   1,175,046  179,200  1,354,246 
Net efficiency, ‘000 USD 
NE = NV – TC – 
GovSub  581,892  516,617  100,800  617,417 
Producers surplus 
PS = (Pd - 
AC)xQ  343,453  278,205  84,000  362,205 
                                                 
4 By definition this is close to the Net transfers in Guadagni et al. (2005). Note that World Bank estimated that total net 
transfers (cotton taxes minus subsidies) in 2004 were equal to 203 million USD. While in our study we estimated that 
this figure in 2006 was equal 238 million USD. 
5 Onwards only number of the raw will be stated in the brackets, which all refer to table 13. 
6 For comparison of government subsidy figures we referred to Guadagni et al. (2005). They sum up the subsidies on 
irrigation, debt write-offs, interest rate credit campaign, oil price differential, fuel, machinery, and fertilizers, which in 
total made 441 million USD. When only oil price differential, fuel, machinery and fertilizers subsidies counted, as in 
our case, the total amount of subsidies equals to 65 million USD.     10 
Consumer surplus 
CS = (Pm-Pd) x 
Q  -  0  16,800  16,800 
Government surplus (taxes) 
GS = ((Pw-Pm) 
x Q) – GovSub  238,406  238,412  0  238,412 
a – Domestic cotton price is weighted average for cotton types – for type I $278 (74%); for type II $ 239 (14%); for 
type III $143 (4%); for type IV $100 (4%); for type V $70 (4%). Source: Syrdarya cotton collection unit. 
b – World cotton price is weighted average for: type I $360 (74%); type II $365 (14%); type III $183 (4%); type IV 
$122 (4%); type V $91 (4%). Source: review of Cotton Outlook website 
2.3. TENURE SECURITY AND COTTON QUOTA 
Government requirements over the cotton production and land use make tenure rights less secure. In 
order to avoid risk of losing the land plots farmers choose activities allowing to increase cotton 
yields to meet the government orders. Very often these activities include excessive use of fertilizers.  
These also called as short-term activities. On the contrary there exist long-term activities, which 
result in higher yields in 3
rd-4
th year after their application.  
The relationship is clear. In order to encourage farmers to use long-term activities (which in many 
studies considered as investment activities) the risks of losing the lands should be reduced (tenure 
security). One way to do this can be fixing cotton quotas over some period of time. When farmers 
will know that quotas will not be altered next year they invest into the soil improvement.  
According to estimates of Uzbek agronomists returns from using short-term activities are immediate. 
Marginal cost for these activities equals 41 USD/ha. Marginal returns from these activities are 74 
USD/ha. The ratio of marginal return and marginal cost from short-term activity, MRR, thus equals 
1,81. These are figures only for one year. For comparing with effects from long-term investment we 
should consider cumulative effect for three years. MRR remains the same. While total marginal cost 
over  three  years  equals  122  USD/ha,  and  total  marginal  revenue  over  three  years  equals  221 
USD/ha. 
On the other hand long-term activities can be observed on the 3
rd-4
th years by incremental 0,3 t/ha, 
and 437 thousand ton nationwide. Marginal cost for conducting these long-term activities equals 22 
USD/ha. Marginal revenue from these activities equals 76,2 USD/ha. The MRR thus equals 3,46, 
which is much higher than under the short-term activities. 
In result the average cost for producing 1 ton of cotton after implementing long-term activities will 
decrease to 145 USD/t. Thus, after three years producers will be able to receive 424 mil. USD of 
producers surplus, which is by 80 mil. USD greater the current levels. Similar government’s surplus 
will be greater by 83 mil. USD.  
Clearly fixing cotton quota over some period of time has far-going positive impact on society, 
producers, and the government. Though farmers’ worries regarding the changes of the cotton quota 
in the next year disappear, the fear that cotton quota levels for the next three years may exist just as 
well.  Indeed  if  such  worries  prevail  less  farmers  would  choose  to  use  long-term  investment 
activities.  
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
Next step for the land refomr in Uzbekistan will be closely associated with solving problem of 
government order for cotton. The problem is that government is not certain that cotton production 
levels would alter if land use control relaxed.  
Obviously radical reforms can not be expected in the near future. In opposite intermediate steps 
should be taken. By these we mean steps that would increase tenure security  rights and create 
favorable environment for farmers to invest into soil improvement:    11 
(1) Relaxing control over the land use while keeping the government order for cotton – 
results indicate that there is potential to produce greater amount of cotton on smaller area.  
It is ben estimated that potentially 56 thousand ha can be withdrawn from cotton land 
areas without significantly altering the levels of cotton output. Alternatively vegetable 
crops can be produced on these freed lands. We had estimated that producers will gain 
84 million USD from free land management on withdrawn land areas. At the same time 
because of greater amount of vegetables produced and as such lower prices consumers 
would be able to gain 16,8 million USD. In sum society would be able to gain 101 
million USD. 
(2) Fixing  cotton  quotas  for  three  years  –  results  indicate  that  annualy  changing  cotton 
quotas affect farmers decision to invest to soil improvement.  
It  is  been  estimated  that  if  producers  choose  long-term  activities  under  fixed  cotton 
quotas producers will gain additional 80 million USD. At the same time government 
would also gain 83 million USD. In sum society would gain 163 million USD.  
CONCLUSION 
Land rights relationship with farmers investment incentives have been well studied before. There is 
clear evidence in the previous studies supporting that secure land rights lead to not only increase in 
production but also soil improvement by means of long-term investments. In this study we used this 
empirically proved evidence as proved fact and calculated the welfare effects from relaxing current 
cotton quota policy and fixing cotton quotas in Uzbekistan.  
Results of our analysis suggest that keeping government control over the land use under cotton 
production is not economically feasible. We were able to estimate that current requirements of 
cotton output can be effectively produced on smaller areas. While withdrawn areas can be used for 
producing alternative crops such as vegetable crops, which in turn would also benefit consumers. 
Fixing  cotton  quota  for  longer  period  of  time  has  also  positive  implications  for  producers  and 
government. For producers this would mean lower average cost, more secure tenure rights, and 
higher returns from cotton production.  
While this study did not use much of the quantitative techniques, application of simple welfare 
analysis tools showed interesting results. Next study using larger sample of observations can either 
verify our results or make our findings more detailed. For example, what will be the welfare effects 
from withdrawing low-quality lands from cotton production. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Authors would like to thank Komil Ahmetov for his valuable contribution to analysis of welfare 
effects from farmers investments and tenure rights, and David Martin for overall supervision and 
fruitful  comments  along  the  research.  This  paper  is  a  product  of  cooperative  research  between 
Economic Policy Reform Porject /Bearing Point/USAID and researchers of Tashkent Institute of 
Irrigation and Mellioration. Any conclusions and results interpretation shown in this paper do not 
neccesserily reflect viewpoint of the USAID and Tashkent Institute of Irrigation and Mellioration, 
but rather represent viewpoint only of authors.  
    12 
REFERENCES 
ALCHIAN, A., DEMSETZ, H. (1972): Production,  Information  Costs,  and  Economic  Organisation, 
American Economic Review, Vol.62(5), pp. 777-795. 
BESLEY, T. (1995): Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana, 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 103(5), pp. 903-937. 
CHERTOVITSKIY, A. S., O. AKBAROV (2007): Issues of Increasing Efficiency of Land Use, Research 
Report, Economic Policy Reform Project, Tashkent, Bearing Point. 
FEDER,  G.,  FEENY,  D.  (1993):  The  theory  of  land  tenure  and  property  rights,  in:  HOFF,  K., 
BRAVERMAN, A.  AND STIGLITZ, J. E.  (eds):  The  Economics  of  Rural  Organization:  Theory, 
Practice, and Policy. Oxford University Press for the World Bank, pp. 240- 258. 
GUADAGNI, M., RAISER, M., CROLE-REES, A., KHIDIROV, D. (2005): Cotton Taxation in Uzbekistan: 
Opportunities for Reform, ECSSD Working Paper No. 41, Tashkent, The World Bank. 
JACOBY,  H.,  LI,  G.,  ROZELLE,  S.  (2000):  Hazards  of  Expropriation:  Tenure  Insecurity  and 
Investment in Rural China, Working Paper, DECRG, the World Bank  
LIN, J. Y. (1993): Government procurement and rice supply response in China, paper presented at 
the Second Workshop on “Projections and Policy Implications of Medium and Long Term Rice 
Supply and Demand” held in Los Banos, Philippines, April. 
LI, G., ROZELLE, S., HUANG, J. (2000): Land Rights, Farmer Investment Incentives, and Agricultural 
Production  in  China,  Working  Paper  No.  00-024,  Davis,  Department  of  Agricultural  and 
Resource Economics, University of California Davis. 
 
 
 